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What is atheism? Although much used in contemporarylanguage, not many people specify what they mean by
the word. ‘Atheism’ has this in common with ‘religion’, at least.
Everyone reading William James’ (1842-1910) seminal
1902 book The Varieties of Religious Experience will be impressed
by the huge variety of religious ideas. Nevertheless, that vari-
ety is to a considerable extent caused by James’ very broad
conception of religion. Jamesian ‘religion’ encompasses all the
fundamental visions of life, including political, ideological and
philosophical stances. Such a view is popular among those who
approach religion from a psychological or sociological per-
spective, as James did. We clearly detect this view in James’s
definition of religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of
individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider
the divine.” (The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in
Human Nature, Penguin edition, p.31.)
What James called ‘Emersonian optimism’ or ‘Buddhist
pessimism’ also betrays a relation to the divine, so these posi-
tions are ‘religions’, according to his definition:
“We must therefore, from the experiential point of view, call these godless
or quasi-godless creeds ‘religions’; and accordingly when in our definition
of religion we speak of the individual’s relation to ‘what he considers the
divine,’ we must interpret the term ‘divine’ very broadly, as denoting any
object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.” (p.34.)
This brought James to a conception of religion as “man’s
total reaction upon life.” (p.35.)
What James’ Definition Implies for Atheism
What does that imply for atheism? The result is clear: if
atheism means ‘opposition to religion’, it means the complete
vanishing of atheism from the world. James approvingly
quotes a colleague of his who had talked about a student “who
was manifesting a fine atheistic ardor... He believes in No-
God, and he worships him.” (p.35.) Believing in ‘No-God’ and
worshipping him? Is that possible? Although a bit “inconve-
nient”, James wrote that this characterization of the student
was defensible on “logical grounds”.
Characterizing atheism or non-belief as a special kind of
belief has become widespread. Roger Scruton, for example,
speaks about “cults like football, sacrificial offerings like
Princess Diana and improvised saints like Linda McCartney.”
(Gentle Regrets: Thoughts from a Life, 2005, p. 232.) The histori-
cally recent orientation on human rights is characterized by
Scruton as “the new secular religion of human rights.”
A religion? In issuing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948 did the United Nations become some kind of
religious organization? Following James’ semantic strategy
would rule out not only ‘atheism’, but also ‘secularization’. The
“new secular religion of human rights” would actually be a rejec-
tion of the secularization thesis.
Although everyone, following Humpty Dumpty, may
choose the meaning of his words according to his own pur-
poses, we might question the wisdom of this inflationary
approach to the concept of ‘religion’. Would it not be better to
reserve this word for an orientation toward some ‘transcendent
reality’? Then atheism is not a religion, but the absence of reli-
gion. In particular, atheism is atheism: it is the rejection of the
theist creed, which in particular means the monotheistic con-
ception of god, ie ‘God’. (I will use the words ‘theism’ and
‘monotheism’ interchangeably here.)
A Limited Concept of Atheism: Rejecting Monotheism
We find this more limited definition of religion implied in
authors such as Ernest Nagel (1901-1985). Nagel puts it as fol-
lows in his ‘A Defense of Atheism’ (1957): “I shall understand
by ‘atheism’ a critique and a denial of the major claims of all
varieties of theism.” Monotheism is the view which holds that
the “heavens and the earth and all that they contain owe their
existence and continuance in existence to the wisdom and will
of a supreme, self-consistent, omnipotent, omniscient, righteous
and benevolent being, who is distinct from, and independent of,
what he has created”, says Nagel, quoting Robert Flint, Profes-
sor of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh. So an atheist is
The Varieties of Atheist Experience
Paul Cliteur asks: if an atheist is someone who doesn’t believe in God,
which God don’t they believe in?
Some Varieties of Atheism
William James: There is no atheism, as religion is
defined to include any fundamental perspective on life.
a-theism: ʻNarrowʼ atheism, involving only the rejection
of monotheism.
atheism: ʻBroadʼ rejection of the possible existence of
any and all divine (supernaturally powerful) beings.
A god not to believe in:
Poseidon
April/May 2010  Philosophy Now 7
someone who denies the existence of a god with the characteristics
as mentioned. In other words: he denies the existence of ‘God’.
We find this approach not only with Nagel, but also with
Robin Le Poidevin, Daniel Harbour and Paul Edwards.
Atheism as a-theism has clear advantages. We know what
we’re talking about, and an impressive tradition in the history
of Western thought can be interpreted as a discussion of the
existence of a God with clearly-definable characteristics. Great
philosophers and theologians from Plato, through Augustine,
Avicenna and Aquinas, to René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, and
these days, Richard Swinburne, Daniel Dennett and Richard
Dawkins, have all participated in this discussion concerning the
existence of a theistic god with characteristics defined by the
church or based on the interpretation of Holy Scripture
(Qur’an or Bible). This is not a conversation about the different
attitudes people have with regard to the ‘ultimate ideals of life’
(James’ definition of religion), but about the characteristics of
the theistic God, and in what sense these are compatible with
each other and with other human ideas. For examples: if God
knows the future, how can we have free will? (Cicero.) What
was God doing before He created the world? (Augustine.) Must
God, if he exists in the mind, also exist in reality? (Anselm.)
Can an omnipotent being be constrained by justice and good-
ness? (Al-Ghazali.) As the author of a recent overview of these
arguments puts it: “thinkers from all three faiths [Judaism,
Christianity and Islam] grappled with the general philosophical
problems that needed solving if the great monotheism they
were jointly constructing was to be viable, developing not
merely sophisticated proofs of God’s existence, but also detailed
conceptions of God’s various key attributes: omnipotence (or
power), omniscience (or knowledge), perfect goodness, eternal-
ity, immutability, and so on.” (Andrew Pessin, The God Question,
2009, p.20.) What this amounts to is that discussions about the
existence of God very often were discussions about the compat-
ibility of the characteristics ascribed to the divine in the theistic
tradition. Those who held that those characteristics are com-
patible were called ‘theists’: those who did not, ‘atheists’.
Seeing atheism as the denial of the theistic conception of
god (God) is clearly different from seeing atheism as ‘the rejec-
tion of all things supernatural’. Yet as Julian Baggini says in
Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (2003), “The atheist’s rejec-
tion of belief in God is usually accompanied by a broader rejec-
tion of any supernatural or transcendental reality. For example,
an atheist does not usually believe in the existence of immortal
souls, life after death, ghosts, or supernatural powers.” (p.4.) He
acknowledges that strictly speaking an atheist could believe in
any of these other things, but, as he contends, “the arguments
and ideas that sustain atheism tend naturally to rule out other
beliefs in the supernatural or transcendental.”
A Common Objection
By the more limited definition of atheism as the denial of
the God of the monotheists, polytheists are atheists. From the
perspective of atheism as a-theism, Greek and Roman polythe-
ism has to be called ‘atheist’, for instance. The depiction of
ultimate reality as impersonal (as we find in the earlier Hindu
Upanishads) would also be classified as atheist. Theravada Bud-
dhism and Jainism, which also reject a creator God, have to be
classed as atheist on this account too. So does pantheism,
being a rejection of a personal God. Spinoza was an atheist
from this point of view, even though he said Nature is God.
Many people find this puzzling.
An even more unacceptable consequence of the definition
of atheism as a-theism, is that liberal conceptions of the divine
would have to qualify as atheist. Not only Spinoza, but the
religious convictions of modern Christian theologians such as
John Robinson (1919-1983) and Paul Tillich (1888-1965)
would be called atheistic as well. Some people find this deeply
counterintuitive, if not offensive. A common objection is that
this gives much too much ground to the fundamentalists.
This criticism can be illustrated with a reference to the work
of one of the best-known representatives of the analytical tradi-
tion in the philosophy of religion: the Oxford philosopher
Anthony Kenny (1931-). Kenny gives a lucid summary of his
views on religion in his bookWhat I Believe (2006). He was
ordained as a Catholic priest in 1955, but he did not think that
the existence of God could be demonstrated. This was a prob-
lem because pontifical doctoral candidates had to take an oath
rejecting various modern heresies. The oath included the
statement that it was possible to demonstrate the existence of
God. After two years of priesthood he decided that he could
no longer continue as a teacher of doctrines and moral pre-
cepts of whose validity he was increasingly doubtful. He
obtained leave from the Pope to return to the lay state. Since
then he has had several academic posts at Oxford. From 1969
to 1972 Kenny lectured on Natural Religion. He analyzed the
relationship between the divine attributes ‘omniscience’,
‘omnipotence’ and ‘benevolence’, and wrote:
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“I argued that these three attributes were incompatible with one another,
as could be seen by reflection on the relationship between divine power
and human freedom. If God is to be omniscient about future human
actions, then determinism must be true. If God is to escape responsibility
for human wickedness, then determinism must be false. So there cannot be
an omniscient, omnipotent, all good being.” (What I Believe, p.8.)
Kenny concluded from this that there cannot be such a
thing as the God of scholastic or rationalist philosophy. Neverthe-
less, this did not bring him to an absolute atheist position.
Why not? Kenny answers: “I left the question open whether
it is possible to conceive, and believe in, a God defined in less
absolute terms.” Is that a reasonable position to take? From
the perspective of atheism as a-theism it is not. (Although
some scholars claim one can adhere to monotheism and yet
reject the belief that an omnipotent God exists.) Kenny seems
to think that he has only rejected the God of scholastic or
rationalist philosophy, but is that true? Hasn’t he done much
more? I think he has. He has rejected the idea of God as
defended through the ages by the church, and also, I’m
inclined to think, God as He appears to us in some important
passages in Holy Scripture.
Whether that last contention is true depends of course on
the question whether the attributes of God as defended by the
church have a firm basis in Scripture. Is it true the Bible pre-
sents us with an omniscient, benevolent and omnipotent per-
sonal deity – or is God an invention of scholastic and rational-
ist philosophy, as Kenny seems to suppose?
My impression is that the church is on much firmer ground
here than liberal theologians like to acknowledge. I think the
characteristics that the church, the church fathers and the
scholastic philosophers have attributed to God do have a firm
basis in Scripture. The Bible does not present us with an
impersonal God who is limited in power, for instance.
A person who believes in a God with the characteristics
described above is generally considered to be a ‘theist’. That is
not very controversial. The controversy centers on the atheist.
What should we call the person who does not believe in that
specific concept of God? One reasonable answer, so it seems to
me (following Harbour, Nagel, Le Poidevin, and the scholars),
is ‘an atheist’. So it seems to me Kenny is an atheist in this sense.
A Broader Definition of Atheism
It’s not only believers who feel a little uncomfortable with
this limited definition of atheism, but self-confessed atheists as
well. Often atheism is characterized in a broader way. Michael
Martin, one of the most interesting contemporary authors on
atheism, writes: “In its broader sense atheism, from the Greek a
(‘without’) and theos (‘deity’), standardly refers to the denial of
the existence of any god or gods”– any god or gods. ‘Atheism’
does not only refer to the denial of the God of monotheism,
then, but to the denial of the God of liberal theism and the
gods of polytheism too.
Leslie Stephen (1832-1904) wrote: “Dogmatic Atheism –
the doctrine that there is no God, whatever may be meant by
God – is, to say the least, a rare phase of opinion.” Whether
this is indeed rare is difficult to say, but it seems senseless to
simply deny the existence of whatever may be meant by ‘God’:
rather, we’d need to first intelligently define what is meant by a
‘god’ – say, ‘a self-sustaining creative personal being’. It is just
as senseless to affirm the existence of a God we know nothing
about – who is completely undefined. Or let me say that dis-
cussing the existence of a God with no characteristics, or char-
acteristics too vague or undetermined to know, implies that
affirming the existence of such a God would be as senseless as
denying the existence of such a God. The liberal theologian
who leaves the existence of such an undefined God ‘open’ is
naturally allowed to do so; but this position is more problem-
atic, and also a little bit more trivial, than he assumes.
The broader definition of atheism as the denial of any divine
entities, as adopted by Michael Martin, George Smith, et al, has
an evident disadvantage though: it is not clear that there is one
single argumentative strategy that can be directed against all
the different ideas of god. When someone says: “I believe that
the shipwreck was prevented by Poseidon,” it is not so clear
how we can ‘prove’ that ships are not rescued by Poseidon but
by natural causes. Or if a Spinozan says: “I believe that God and
nature are the same”, how could we refute this? Whatever we
may think of these two statements of religious confession, it’s
clear that rejecting polytheism (Poseidon rescuing the sailors) or
pantheism (Spinoza) requires a completely different argument
from that of rejecting theism in the classical, orthodox sense.
The discussion on the merits of classical theism proceeds
according to the pattern of classical philosophers, some trying to
defend theodicy (eg Leibniz), others trying to attack it (Hume,
for instance). [Theodicy is the attempt to rationalise the goodness
and omnipotence of God in an evil world full of suffering – Ed.]
I think George Smith is on firmer ground when he says that
some theists have been called ‘atheists’ for disbelieving in the
God (or gods) of the ‘orthodox majority’. This focuses on the
narrower definition of atheism. This is also the case when
Martin notes: “inWestern society the term atheism has most
frequently been used to refer to the denial of theism, in particu-
lar Judeo-Christian theism. This [theism] is the position that a
being that is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good exists who
is the creator of the universe, and who takes an active interest in
human concerns, and guides his creatures by revelation.”(‘Athe-
ism’, in The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, edited by Tom Flynn,
2007, p.88.) Also, the ‘New Atheism’ by Dawkins, Harris,
Hitchens and Dennett is mainly atheism as a-theism, that is,
against classical monotheism. Dawkins makes this clear when he
writes about the so-called ‘religion’ of Albert Einstein, for exam-
ple. Einstein does not believe in a ‘personal God’. His ‘religion’
is based on (and identified with) “the unbounded admiration for
the structure of the world so far as our science can reveal it.” But
if this is religion, then Dawkins is religious as well.
James and his many contemporary followers may define
their concepts as they like, of course; but again, we clearly
need a special word for the denial of the orthodox idea of the
divine which the Jewish, Christian and Islamic religions share:
the idea of God. ‘Atheism’ seems not a bad choice for this word.
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